A partition strategy for Iraq
Kurdishaspect.com - By: Daniel Anderson
What do the Kurds want?
If the Kurds are genuinely afforded the opportunity to determine their own future, then the probable result will be an independent Kurdish state in the north of Iraq coexisting with an Arab entity to the South. To avoid this outcome, the Arab population must be prepared to tolerate a degree of Kurdish autonomy that they have never previously been willing to accept, and the Kurds must take it on trust that an Arab-dominated central government will not renege on promises made when (subsequently) in a position to do so. Neither seems likely. Rather it seems plausible that the Kurds elect to fulfill their long-cherished dream of independence. The possibility of an independent Kurdish state raises a number of important concerns, but on balance, an independent Kurdistan resolves more problems that it creates.
How is this viable?
Governance will be through the two major Kurdish factions (the PUK and KDP) along with the representatives of the Turcoman and Assyrian communities. In practice, the administration of Iraqi Kurdistan will continue much as it has for the last decade or so. In terms of security forces, the Kurds will not disband the Peshamrag forces, so each unit must be allowed to organize its own security forces.
Where would the borders fall?
Given that there has been no reliable census Iraq since 1957, the exact distribution of the Kurdish population relative to the Arab population in northern Iraq is unknown. Nonetheless, certain cities, Erbil and Suleimaniyah, for example, are indisputably, Kurdish, while Mosul is clearly Arab-dominated. An independent Kurdish state would not, therefore, include Mosul within its borders. The status of Kirkuk is the obvious sticking point. As a result of decades of ethnic cleansings Arab most certainly form a plurality, if not an absolute majority in Kirkuk. However, Arab and Kurdish perspectives on the significance of Kirkuk differ. For the Kurds, Kirkuk is their Jerusalem; for successive Arab regimes, the core issues have always been the control over the large Kirkuk oil field. These two issues are separable in that the inclusion of Kirkuk in an independent Kurdistan does not necessarily entail Kurdish control over the oil reserves Kirkuk the city should be part of Kurdish state ; Kirkuk the oil field ( at least at its entirety) need not be. Other than the inclusion of Kirkuk, the boundaries of an independent
Kurdish state would not differ significantly from the already established boundaries of the autonomous Kurdish region.
How would a Kurdish state survive?
A Kurdish state in Northern Iraq would be small in terms of population; somewhere between 4 to 5 million. It would be also landlocked and surrounded by much larger, more powerful, and probably hostile regimes ( Turkey, Iran, Syria, and an Arab state to the south). An unprotected Kurdistan would not last five minutes in such an environment. The only way an Independent Kurdistan can be sustained as a viable entity is to establish a permanent U.S. or international military presence there. The establishment of military bases in Kurdistan would be tantamount to guarantee of protection. As such, Kurdistan is the only part of Iraq in which the population would welcome U.S. troops enthusiastically. From a U.S. perspectives, Kurdistan would actually be an ideal location from which to police neighboring "rouges" (Iran and Syria), without requiring troops to set foot on only holy ground or Arab territory. Rather than constituting an onerous long-term burden on the U.S. then, the prospect of policing the region out of Kurdistan could more accurately be perceived as an opportunity.
Economically, Kurdistan's prospects would be better than they first appear. Optimally, some form of agreement could be negotiated with the Arab state to the south where Kurdistan would receive proportions of the revenues form the Kirkuk oil filed. Over a longer term, Kurdistan is in fact very well place to become a regional trading hub. Located at the crossroads of three great civilizations (Turkish, Arab, and Persian), it is difficult to envisage Kurdistan emerging as an important commercial center for the region. Initially, there is likely to be considerable hostility toward a nascent Kurdish state-especially from Turkey. Over time, however, once Kurdistan becomes an internationally reality, Turkey would have little option but to open up trade routes through the newly established entity. Simply put, If Turkey wants to have any trade relations with Iraq, and then goods cannot avoid traversing Kurdish territory. The presence of U.S. military bases and, perhaps, 30,000 to 50,000 foreign troops would also provide a significant contribution to the Kurdish economy.
Politically, the potential danger is one of imposition. Relation between the main Kurdish factions- the PUK and the KDP- have not always been amiable, to say the least. In the nis-1990s indeed, this tense relationship erupted into open military conflict and came close to ripping apart the Kurds' fragile experiment with democracy. Since 1997, the animosity between the two organizations has diminished considerably and the de facto Kurdish state has been governed as essentially two separate entities. Clearly, if the likely consequence of creating a Kurdish state were a resumption of civil war, then this would rather seriously undermine the argument in favor of independence. Yet there are several reasons why this is unlikely.
First, strong international suppor t will impart stability sufficient to prevent this from occurring; second, the collapse of the united Kurdish government, though partly self-inflicted, was precipitated primarily by external interference on the part of neighboring powers. Again, the U.S. can flex its military muscle if necessary to prevent the repetition of this. Third, the leaders of both factions, Barzani (KDP) and Talabani ( PUK) have extremely powerful incentives not to destroy what may prove to be the Kurds' one chance at independent statehood. History will judge neither man kindly if personal rivalry is permitted to sabotage Kurdish independence. Finally, since 1997, both parties have demonstrated capacity for peaceful coexistence-not just with each other but also other ethnic and religious minorities located within Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurdistan may not be procedurally democratic (both entities are essentially governed as one party statelets), but it is liberal and tolerant.
What happens to the rest of Iraq?
The remainder of Iraq would be largely ethnically homogenous. Geographically, it would look something like ancient Mesopotamia with the majority of population located in the "land between two rivers". Ethnically and historically, this new state of Mesopotamia would be much more coherent than the old state of Iraq. Critically, the removal of Kurdistan from the equation would make Mesopotamia significantly easier to govern. The constant strain of using military force to maintain the territorial integrity of the Iraqi state would be removed, as would the capacity for external powers to use the Kurds as surrogates to destabilize the central government. That Iraq has been governed by a succession of militaristic, violent regimes in due, is no more measure, to the intractability of Kurdish problem. Remove the problem and there is the possibility that Mesopotamia could be governed by something more appealing than the Baath party. This may, or may not look much like a democracy, but it would be significant move in the right direction.
Finally, it is worth nothing that an independent Kurdish state is already in existence in all but name. The Kurds have their own governing institutions, control over territory, defined borders, and capable armed forces. International recognition of the reality of an independent Kurdish state in North of Iraq is already on ground and the only missing piece of jigsaw. At this point it is impossible to imagine how Kurdistan can be integrated back into the artificial state of Iraq.
An independent Kurdish state is inevitable and definitely will bring perpetual peace and stability to the entire region.
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February 10, 2008
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