Five years of war: Philosophical failure of US and Britain in Iraq - PART 2
Kurdishaspect.com - By Dr Kamal Mirawdeli
Why is Iraq war a philosophical failure?
The core of philosophy is epistemology. That is what and how we know and how we know what we know and know that what we know is what is there to be known through our knowing it. If we believe that what we know is what is to be known without proving it through objective data and learning from experience, then what we think that we know is not epistemology but ideology. Ideology breeds and idealises dogmas. Dogmas fossilize realities. Then we will never learn anything from anything but repeat what defies data and deadly deductions. On the fifth anniversary of Iraq war, Robert Fisk has written: “The only lesson we ever learn is that we never learn.”
This all sounds bloody confounding. I remember that Donald Rumsfeld once said something philosophical like this before the beginning of Iraq war. I looked for it, and thanks to the omniscient Internet search engine, I found it re-classified as a short poem:
“The Unknown
By Donald Rumsfeld
As we know,
There are known knowns.
There are things we know we know.
We also know
There are known unknowns.
That is to say
We know there are some things
We do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns,
The ones we don't know
We don't know.
—Feb. 12, 2002, Department of Defense news briefing.”
[Source, http://www.slate.com/id/2081042]
I wonder what ‘unknown unknowns’ have led to the present philosophical fiasco of Iraq .
But actually Iraq was not so confusing and concealing. It could unravel easily if anyone cared to use the dialectical method initiated by Socrates a long time ago. This is a very simple but rewarding method. You start epistemology by asking the ontological question: the what of what something is, and then you try to find contradictions involved in the ‘definitions’ until a standard definition satisfying the views of all the participating dialoguers is reached.
This means that, instead of taking the existing definitions, descriptions, and denouements of Iraq for granted, the protagonists of Iraq project should have asked the question afresh: What is Iraq ? Here, history and reality, past and present, could have helped them a lot to carry out their workshop SWOT analysis in an informed insightful way based on armoury of reason not arsenal of ignorance and arrogance. This basic question of looking for a basic starting-point could have led to the second more penetrating SWOT-oriented question: What has been wrong with Iraq so far? What are its strength and weak points (from a liberator’s point of view)?
No, these questions, as results show, have never been asked or seriously asked. The pre-given answer was: Saddam Hussein is all what is wrong with Iraq ? Then even if this were the answer, still there should have been the strategic SWOT question: What are the opportunities and dangers that will result from the removal of Saddam?
To modernise the Socratic method of dialectical query, we need to supplement it with Michel Foucault’s approach to knowledge. From a Foucaultian point of view Iraq is not an eternal quintessential entity. It is just a ‘statement’ with no meaning g in itself. Foucault describes ‘statement’ as ‘event’ and this gives it a wider existential dimension in particular in terms of power-knowledge relationship “Rather than looking for a deeper meaning underneath discourse or looking for the source of meaning in some transcendental subject, Foucault analyzes the conditions of existence for meaning.”
To understand a statement (or a definition) such as Iraq at any moment of history we need to analyse its conditions of existence especially in term of power/knowledge relationship. Foucault “refuses to examine statements outside of their role in the discursive formation, and he never examines possible statements that could have emerged from such a formation…..The whole of the system and its discursive rules determine the identity of the statement. But, a discursive formation continually generates new statements, and some of these usher in changes in the discursive formation that may or may not be realized.”
Foucault has explained in his “Archaeology of Knowledge” that a statement has:
- Its space of existence
- Its conditions of existence
- Its mode of existence
- Its function of existence
I think the last one is the more decisive factor for the existence of a statement as event because it expresses its function or rather the possibility of its function in relation to power. Iraq has existed for the last 80 year’s because of its different political function and embodiment of power interests defining its modality of existence. But of course the application of all the four elements of analysis is essential to understand the modality and function of Iraq as a continuous event (national state).
I am not going to embark upon such an after-event analysis. I just remind the reader how I did my best to simplify the problematic of Iraq for its neo-con liberators and their British fellow travellers. In the analytical article I referred to above, I described the problematic of Iraq as “simple realism” and suggested simple easily-achievable solutions based on this basis
Iraq’s “simple realism”
How can such a complex situation as Iraq be described as ‘simple realism’?
It can if we bother to ask the simple ontological questions explained above or alternatively we are prepared to listen to the diversity of the views of people who lived the reality of Iraq during the 80 years of its existence as a ‘statement.”
When the death toll of American soldiers in Iraq reached 1000, I wrote an article entitled “De-liberation: Bremer’s legacy and post-Bremer choices”, (http://www.kurdmedia.com/articles.asp?id=9701) explaining in detail and graphic way how Bremer was working for de-liberation and destabilisation in Iraq by ignoring or rather acting against Iraq’s ‘simple realism’. This is how I suggested simple realistic naturally-emerging smooth solutions based on the ‘simple realism’ of the Iraqi situation: [Quote]
“My ideas from the beginning were simple and realistic:
- Recognise the reality of three political cultures and territories in Iraq .
- Don’t recentralise power. Start with regional decentralisation as an essential means of liberation and democratisation.
- The Shias and Kurds do support the toppling of Saddam, let them take advantage of your liberation and alliance and organise democratic elections in their peaceful areas for their own federal regions. (This could have been done in the first three months!) Thus you will neutralise and weaken the Ba’thists in Sunni Arab triangle. You wouldn’t need to fight them as long as they too would be prepared to enter democratic process to establish their own federal region.
- For Kurdistan it has anyway enjoyed de facto independence since 1991 and thus has become a factor of peace, stability and democratic secular prospect in the region.
Americans died unnecessarily to prevent this act of actual liberation.
They died and in the process created further mayhem in Iraq to recreate a centralised state which can only be ruled by a Saddam and his model of dictatorship, death and destruction. But still the Americans died in vain. And they will die in vain as long as the illusion is entertained.
So what is the result?
So what is the result of not accepting this simple realism and working hard to complicate the reality of Iraq through bloodshed and destruction?
Did Bremer change anything?
Did the death of 1000 US soldiers end this simple realism?
Did Bremer manage to control Fallujah and apprehend the Sunni rebels there?
Did he manage to safeguard Najaf, Kufa and Karbala and apprehend the firebrand cleric Muqtada Sadr?
Did he please the Kurds by even refusing to mention the word Kurdistan ?
No, nothing of the above happened.
The reality of Iraq ’s three-throng division is becoming more real and entrenched by day and hour.
Now the Shia’ areas are controlled and governed by the Shia. Since Sistani accepted Muqtada Sadr, he has become untouchable. Shia areas are controlled by Shia clerics, Shia bureaucrats, Shia police and Shia militias!!
Al'awi had no choice but to accept this reality and invite the rebellious Muqtada to join the political process (the illusion) which he refused.
Sunni areas (the triangle) are pro-B’athist. They have their own Arab-Sunni nationalist character. They will never accept the rule of the Shias or the Kurds. So the resistance, rebellion and terrorism there will continue and be visited upon other parts of Iraq unless and until they control at least their own areas. This is already happening. After Bremer was forced to concede the control of Fallujah to the Sunnis (a combination of anti-American Islamists and Saddamists), now the Sunni rebellion has spread to Samara, Ramadi, Ba'quba and parts of Baghdad . They are now in control of these cities and areas. Al’awi is not in a position to do anything about this. Both Al’awi and Yawar have declared that they would issue general amnesty to all rebels and murderers including murderers of American soldiers.
Well-done Bremer! You have left a fantastic legacy!
The Kurds with their own parliament, government, economy and army are keeping the peace and stability in their areas and are fearful of any real contact with Arabs
So the Iraqi political scene now totally corresponds to its simple realism:
- Shias are in control of their own region with their own political, religious and military structure.
- Kurds are in control of their own lands, apart from some the city of Kirkuk , with their own well-established political structure and military power.
- The Sunnis are gaining strength in their areas to control their central cities through their own militia and establish their own political control there!!
So what Bremer foolishly sacrificed the blood of American soldiers and reputation of America to prevent happening, is actually happening. In fact it has always been there. It did not need to happen. It just needed peaceful rational recognition and realisation.
So where is Bremer’s ideal of one unified Arabist Iraqist Iraq! “
[Unquote]
Yes, I wrote this in October 2003, when the toll of American death was 1000. Further, I concluded with the two possible solutions available for the Americans and the British in Iraq : [Quote]
“There are only two choices now [in October 2003]:
Choice 1: The US and Britain undertake to stay in Iraq and be peace-keepers until a new Saddam is created and a strong central Iraqi government is established. This, in the last analysis, would imply: the use of force against the Shias, Muqtada Sadr and others, to force them accept the power of the central state.
It would also mean infringing on the de facto independence of Kurdistan to a degree that it would create a massive resentment and backlash.
So where can US get enough military power to fight on these two fronts?
They must depend on Arab Saddamite Sunnis!! This means a process of total rehabilitation of the Ba’thist army and Saddam’s old militia, starting with general amnesty and ending with bringing them back to power. Until this happens both US and Britain need to send many more of their soldiers to death to control foreign Islamists and Shia, and possibly Kurdish fighters. […….]
To avoid further disaster, the US and Britain must apply the model of Yugoslavia to Iraq and allow the three sections of the population to determine their futures through separate referendums. Centralisation can only lead to further costly illusions, dictatorship, conflict and blood shed. Territorial decentralisation is the only way towards creating peaceful co-existence, stability and democracy.
According to this scenario, you should stop the process of assembling an artificial sectarian-ethnic national council. These tricks will not do. Let the Kurdistanis, Shias and Sunnis have referendums and freely elect their own National Assemblies.
Bury Bremer’s deliberation legacy now.” (End of quote)
I always insisted that it is only decentralisation which allows for democratisation: whether this decentralisation is governed by local ethnic or sectarian character this is something you cannot help and change. This is the natural self-expression of simple-realism theory.
Here again I quote from another article I published on Kurdishmedia on 23 April 2004 [http://www.kurdmedia.com/articles.asp?id=9574]and in which I predicted that the foolish policies of the US and British in Iraq would turn it into a lethal combination of Hamas-style Islamic suicide bombing and Vietnam . I quote:
“From the start both Kurdistan and Shia areas were calm and supportive of liberation. The US and Britain should have recognised the simple fact that it would be impossible to bring these three entities with a bloody history of conflict together within one centralised state. Sistani should have been told "yes you can have elections in all Shia’ areas to elect a regional assembly."
The Kurds would do the same in Kurdistan including Kirkuk and Mosul .
This would have reduced the problems the coalition suffer from by 75% and would have isolated the pro-Baath Sunnis forcing them eventually to give up violence or otherwise be defeated or neutralised paving the way for elections in Sunni areas too allowing them to elect their own assembly too.
In this way democracy could be established through decentralisation and neither Shias nor Sunnis would be allowed to control others. The right framework for the emergence of civil society institutions would have been established. By now the coalition could show the world 90% success with money flowing in from everywhere for reconstruction and regional powers would be too embarrassed or frightened to be able to interfere. But without political solution even economic reconstruction would be impossible.
Why did this not happen?
This has not happened yet because of ignorance and arrogance, because of political failure, because of lack of courage and imagination, because truth was replaced by lies for political purposes. Because everyone lied to Americans and Americans lied to themselves as they seemed to be interested only in ensuring the flow and export of oil and keeping Kurdistan as an Arab colony.” {End of quote)
I could see through the events how all the American claims of liberation and democracy (I will talk about democracy later) will come to nothing as a result defying and distorting the historical, cultural, social and ideological reality of Iraq . I wrote on Feb 21, 2004:
“In this way Paul Bremer will not only turn Bush himself but the whole agenda of neo-conservatives in Iraq and the Middle East a sick joke.”
And now how many more hundred thousands would die before the US and Britain wake up in the sea of blood and see this simple realism?
In the following articles I will quickly look at the results that Britain and the US have achieved as a result of drowning this simple realism in blood and tears and insisting on the course of what I have called from the very start of the war: “ignorance and arrogance.”
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March 24, 2008
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