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June 24, 2010
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The Progress of the Peshmerga Forces and their role in post-2003 Iraq
Kurdishaspect.com - By Saeed Kakeyi
The newly-elected KNA could not hide the tension between the KDP and the PUK and their respective peshmerga forces. Thanks to the regional interferences, by the mid-1990s, peshmergas of the KDP and the PUK had once more divided Iraqi Kurdistan (McDowall, 386). The PUK, while having less manpower with only 12,000 active peshmerga and 6,000 reserves, had greater firepower, including T-54 and T-55 tanks, artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers, 106mm recoilless rifles, light anti-aircraft machine guns, SA-7s, and 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars, captured from the defeated Iraqi military forces in 1991 (Lortz, 63).
KDP and PUK leaderships continued to push their peshmergas into proxy skirmishes throughout 1995, killing hundreds and infuriating the Kurdish populace (Gunter, 235). Ceasefires were signed and broken as both sides sought regional allies to strengthen their forces.
The ability of the KDP’s marriage with the Iraqi devil was evident as Iraqi artillery “softened” PUK targets before Iraqi tanks and helicopters began their assault on PUK strong holds. The heaviest Iraqi attack occurred in Erbil in August 1996 when 3,000 lightly-armed PUK peshmergas faced 40,000 Iraqi armored soldiers backed by the KDP fighters. The Iraqi military seized Erbil and helped the KDP peshmerga to push the PUK frontlines closer to the Iranian border (Lortz, 63).
Though was too late, the Clinton administration insisted on the peshmergas to halt down their internal fights if the KDP-PUK leaderships wished to be included among continuing U.S.-sponsored Iraqi opposition groups. Unfortunately, for the Kurdish cause, the nearly decade-long “Kurdish Civil War” disheartened many Kurdish civilians, as they began to lose confidence in the political leadership of the warring factions (McDowall, 391-392).
With coercive diplomacy, the 1998 U.S. sponsored “Washington Agreement” was reached ending the internal fighting between the KDP and the PUK peshmergas. The Agreement laid-down a timetable for:
- 1.“October 1st 1998: The KDP begins to extend appropriate financial a quittance on monthly basis to the public service ministries in the PUK areas.
- 2.October 15th 1998: Timeline for repatriation of persons displaced by the former conflict. Agreement on restoration of property or compensation by responsible parties.
- 3.Beginning of November 1998: Joint consultations with the Government of Turkey.
- 4.November 1st 1998: Coordination and Cooperation of humanitarian ministries complete. Revenues contributed by KDP to the ministries flowing from KDP areas to PUK areas.
- 5.November 15th 1998: Progress report on repatriation, unification of ministries and revenue sharing.
- 6.January 1st 1997: First meeting of the interim assembly. Interim Joint Government establishes a plan to normalize Erbil, Dohuk and Suleimani.
- 7.April 1st 1997: Interim Joint Government establishes a plan for the organization of elections.
- 8.July 1st 1997: Regional elections” (Kurdistanica, 1998).
- However, the international emergence of the al-Qaeda terrorist network following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. did not allow peshmerga weapons to be silent for very long. Although sporadic fighting continued with the PKK, the PUK peshmergas faced their largest threat from Ansar al-Islam, an al-Qaeda-sponsored terrorist group attempted to establish itself in Iraqi Kurdistan. Led by Mulla Krekar, a Kurd of ex-communist and a strict Islamic faith, Ansar al-Islam was composed of over 500 terrorists, many of whom fled Afghanistan after the U.S. mission.
Although they were professional in their mountain-based guerrilla tactics, the PUK peshmergas had difficulty countering the terrorist methods of Ansar al-Islam. With alleged support from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, Ansar al-Islam was able to gain some PUK held rigid terrain. However, U.S. preparations to oust Saddam Hussein and with initial KDP support, the PUK peshmergas were able to manage the conflict.
The Peshmerga Forces during the Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003)
The deployment of CIA agents to Kurdistan followed by the 10th U.S. Special Forces Group (SFG) (Robinson: 2004, 296 cited in Lortz, 66) began a new era in U.S.-Kurdish relations, an era that would witness unprecedented cooperation between peshmerga forces and the most powerful military in the world (Lortz, 66). Arriving in July 2002, the CIA agents claimed to be on a counterterrorism mission against Ansar Al-Islam; a mainly Kurdish terrorist group was holding ground to the east of the Suleimani province near the Iran-Iraq border prior to the 2003 Iraq War. However, the CIA rarely worked with the peshmergas to achieve its claimed mission. According to Michael Lortz, “[T]he true mission of the CIA was to acquire intelligence about the Iraqi government and military” (Lortz, 66).
Due to their traditional practice, the CIA agents, initially, were not friendly with the peshmergas. Their method of recruiting and paying informants undermined the peshmerga’s ability to purchase black market weapons. However, when the U.S. intention of removing Saddam’s regime was confirmed, the CIA relied on peshmerga intelligence gathering; and eventually cooperated with the KDP-PUK peshmergas to destroy key Iraqi infrastructures and installations ahead of the U.S. invasion in March 2003.
In sheer peer manner, the cooperation between the peshmergas and the U.S SFG was far closer than the peshmerga-CIA relationship. Upon the arrival of the SFG in January 2003, the peshmerga became an integral part of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), especially in uprooting the Ansar Al-Islam from Kurdistan.
The destruction of Ansar al-Islam was beneficial to both the U.S. and Iraqi Kurdistan. For the U.S. SFG, the removal of Ansar Al-Islam, on the one hand was a token of friendship given to the Kurds, and it destroyed a vital part of the al-Qaeda network on the other hand. As for the peshmergas, the elimination of Ansar Al-Islam was critically needed to nullify any future threat to peshmerga operations during the forthcoming liberation of Iraq and beyond. As Kurdish trust and confidence in American intentions established, PUK and KDP peshmergas were chosen by the U.S. as the best regional allies and were placed under the direct command of the U.S. Army (Lortz, 66). The PUK peshmergas were commanded by U.S. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Kenneth Tovo and the KDP peshmergas were led by fellow LTC Robert Waltemeyer (Robinson, 301 cited in Lortz, 66).
In 2003, to give extra meanings to the Newroz celebrations—the Kurdish New Year calendar beginning on 21 March—U.S. forces launched Tomahawk missiles at selected Ansar al-Islam positions throughout the Sargat Valley in the district of Sharazour. As the ground assault began, LTC Tovo led his six mixed PUK peshmerga-Special Forces units; and, within two days, the peshmerga-Special Forces teams succeeded in removing Ansar al-Islam from the Sargat Valley, killing most and forcing those who remained to flee over the Iranian border (Robinson, 302-306 cited in Lortz, 67). The KDP peshmerga-10th SFG operations involved attacking the Iraqi forces positioned along the northern part of the “Green Line”—separating Iraqi forces from the Kurdish forces (Lortz, 67).
As overwhelmed by the U.S. air strikes assaults and peshmerga artillery fire, Iraqi forces that had difficult fighting with nearly 100,000 peshmergas north and west of Mosul city, began a strategic retreat to positions closer to Kirkuk. While this was happening, eager peshmerga units began occupying the vacated Iraqi positions and lead the U.S. forces into the oil-rich provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk (Robinson, 325-26 cited in Lortz, 68).
A day after the occupation of Baghdad on 9 April, 2003, the first KDP peshmerga force entered Mosul on 10 April, engaged the Iraqi army, secured their objectives, and pulled out of the city on 12 April in accordance with the wishes of the U.S. leadership.
Though the PUK peshmergas entered and remained in Kirkuk city against the wishes of the U.S., they had a valid reason to do so. For the Kurdish leadership in Iraq, Kirkuk is the core of the Kurdish conflict with Baghdad governments and the neighboring countries. PUK argued that its presence in the city would deter any regional interference in the shaping of the upcoming Iraqi government. Therefore, securing the contested city by Kurds meant to have a better position in negotiating a new political system that Iraq needs to be governed by.
In any case, the joint Kurdistani-U.S. attacks from 21 March to 12 April 2003 defeated thirteen Iraqi divisions, prevented Iraqi forces from reinforcing their southern defenses, captured strategic airfields throughout northern Iraq (Robinson, 340 cited in Lortz, 68), and reduced the ability of the Ansar Al-Islam to terrorize the Kurdish population in Iraq.
As Lortz asserts, “[t]he Kurdish peshmerga, assisted by the U.S. military, were finally able to defeat the Iraqi military and topple its oppressive leadership. The fighting spirit of the peshmerga had succeeded in forcing a new chapter in Kurdish history - yet another era of attempted power sharing between Arabs and Kurds (Lortz, 68).
The Peshmerga Forces in the post-2003 Iraq
As the U.S. liberated Iraq from the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration, scrutinized by some powerful members of the United Nations, was forced to accept its role in Iraq as an occupying country. Accordingly, the U.S. administration established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq. With transitional responsibility, the CPA decided to reconstruct and reconstitute Iraq.
These fundamental changes created challenges and opportunities for the CPA and the U.S. forces. The challenges can be grouped into three settings: Iraqi multi-communal challenges, the nondemocratic totalitarian mindset and the postwar international legitimacy. Of the most critical challenges the CPA had to deal with was the deep-rooted Iraqi polity (Dobbins and et al.: 2003, 168).
Unfortunately, the CPA preferred dealing with the nondemocratic totalitarian challenges by dissolving the Iraqi army and implementing the ill-advised de-Ba’athification policy. The result was a rapidly growing resistance which helped nurturing and expanding the Al-Qaeda network in Iraq.
As tested during the liberation of Iraq, Kurds—politically and militarily—were ready to meet some of these challenges. Politically, Kurdish leadership engaged with most Iraqi influential figures opposing the U.S. presence. With U.S. backings, Kurdish leaders encouraged Arab Sunni leaders to participate in the new Iraqi political process. However, for the peshmergas to participate in peace-building and occasional peace-enforcement missions, the KDP and PUK leaders insisted on getting full recognition for their Kurdish forces.
Though Kurds did not get all they wanted, the CPA allowed the Kurds to retain their existing peshmerga forces in its drafted Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). Adopted by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in March 2004, Article 54(A) of the TAL stipulates that:
“The Kurdistan Regional Government shall continue to perform its current functions throughout the transitional period, except with regard to those issues which fall within the exclusive competence of the federal government as specified in this Law. Financing for these functions shall come from the federal government, consistent with current practice and in accordance with Article 25(E) of this Law. The Kurdistan Regional Government shall retain regional control over police forces and internal security, and it will have the right to impose taxes and fees within the Kurdistan region” (CPA, 2004).
The legal interpretation for the above mentioned sub-article provides a legitimate status for the peshmerga forces. Accordingly, the Kurdish leadership agreed to send their peshmergas to partake in operations with the Coalition Forces. Many peshmergas became border guards or were assigned to protect vital oil pipelines and others continued operations with the U.S. Special Forces. According to Lortz, nearly 7,000 peshmergas, nicknamed “Peshrambo”, were trained in commando operations and assisted in the hunt for Ansar al-Islam and other Al-Qaeda related militants (Lortz, 69).
As the TAL and its Annexes legitimized the existence of the peshmerga forces, close to 35,000 peshmergas enrolled in the Kurdish Border Guards (KBG) formations. After receiving proper training at the Qalachuwalan and Zakho military academies, scores of young and intellectual peshmergas graduated as military officers serving in the newly formed Iraqi Army. The remaining peshmergas involved in assisting the U.S. forces with interrogations, flash-checkpoints and peace-enforcement missions.
Yet, when the Iraqi anti-Kurdish elements complained of too much power has been given to the Kurdish peshmergas and asked for their disbandment, leaders of the KDP and the PUK responded with firm answers. In official statements Masoud Barzani insisted the KDP keep their peshmerga, calling them a “symbol of the resistance” (Sharp: 2005, 5-6 cited in Lortz, 71). Jalal Talabani also contributed to the idea of retaining a loyal peshmerga force by discussing initiatives that would invest in accommodations for peshmergas, including housing and a special peshmerga store.
Furthermore, in a joint letter, dated June 1, 2004, and communicated to the U.S. president George W. Bush, Masoud Barzani of the KDP and Jalal Talabani of the PUK raised concerns with some U.S. diplomats who were echoing anti-Kurdish sentiments about the peshmerga identity. Among other things, the letter states that:
“A year ago, our peshmerga forces fought side by side with the American forces for the liberation of Iraq, taking more casualties than any other US ally. Today, Kurdistan remains the only secure and stable part of Iraq. We note that, in contrast to the Arab areas of Iraq, no coalition soldier has been killed in the area controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government…US officials have demeaned the peshmerga, calling this disciplined military force that was America’s battlefield comrade in arms, ‘militia’” (Navend, 2004).
Although the peshmerga’s military status has been contested, Iraqi Arab political relations with the Kurdish leadership took a large step forward when the PUK leader Jalal Talabani was elected President of Iraq in May 2005. With Masoud Barzani elected President of Iraqi Kurdistan in June 2005, the potential to achieve the goals of generations of peshmergas became greatly enhanced.
Yet, as the new Iraqi Constitution was ratified by a referendum on 15 October 2005, peshmerga forces gained unprecedented constitutional status. The Fifth Section of Article 121 states as following:
“The Regional Government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the region, particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the region such as police, security forces and guards of the region” (USIP, 2006).
According to Jabar Yawar, KRG Minister of Peshmerga Affairs, “[t]his is (the constitutional right) by far the most acceptable legal remedy for the KRG in transforming the 100,000 peshmergas into Kurdish National Guards (KNG) and effective police and security forces” (Ali, 2007).
The KRG also negotiated with the Iraqi federal government the formation of three Iraqi army brigades each with over 3,000 former peshmergas to be stationed only in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, as the sectarian violence escalated in central Iraq throughout 2006 and the first half of 2007, the Coalition Forces requested these Kurdish guards and army units to temporarily be deployed to the provinces of Baghdad, Diyala, Salahaddin, and Mosul to keep the peace and participate in civil military affairs. In fact, according to a Kurdish-Globe report, Dr. Mahmoud Al-Mash’hadani—a Sunni Arab, Chairman of the Iraqi Council of Representative, “in a closed session of the Iraqi Parliament last month…had called upon the Kurdish leadership to send Peshmerga forces to Baghdad to protect the lawmakers” (Kirkuki, 2006).
Like the Americans, Kurdish troops are a slender peacekeeping force standing between the warring Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs and to fighting insurgents. U.S. commanders consider them a critical part of the peace enforcement in Baghdad and other troubled spots of Iraq because of their fighting prowess and perceived neutrality. In May 2007, more than 2,100 peshmergas were deployed to Baghdad‘s troubled Bayya area. Then on June 14, Radio Free Iraq (RFI) reported that “more than 2,000 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters will be sent to help achieve security in the volatile Diyala province upon the request of the Iraqi government and the Multi-National Forces” (RFI, 2007). These Kurdish soldiers have been instrumental in taking the U.S. peace enforcement troops to neighbourhoods and quarters in Iraqi urbanized centres that previously were off limits to them. Thanks to peshmerga help, present-day Iraq is 70% safer than it was in 2006.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to account for the development of the peshmerga and its role in the Kurdish struggle in Iraq as well as its role in peace enforcement in post-2003 Iraq. While supporting Kurdish nationalism, the peshmerga’s continuous defiance of Iraqi Arab authority, despite being frequently outnumbered or overpowered, have reinvigorated the Kurdish spirit. To mention the peshmerga in passing, as many authors have done, or to label the peshmerga as merely “militias”, is to marginalize the contribution of the organized Kurdish fighting force in Kurdish history. For a people who have depended on their fighting ability for centuries in order to maintain their national identity, it is difficult to see the Kurdish in Iraq without the peshmerga forces.
As seen in this paper, not only have previous interastate agreements been nullified, but the Kurds have also been “abandoned” by three of the world’s premier superpowers: the British in the 1920s, the Soviet Union in the 1940s, and the U.S. in both the 1970s and the 1990s. It is little surprise then that after gaining power the Kurds would be hesitant to disband their only real source of self-defense.
The ideal of the peshmerga as “guardians” of Kurdish nationalism will continue far beyond the generation of Mustafa and Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. As older peshmerga step away from the battlefield and assume political roles, new peshmerga fill the ranks to protect their national identity and to help bring peace to those who live in violence.
References:
1.Ali, Nuri (25 June 2005). KRG agrees that peshmerga will become 'regional guard'. Kurdistani New (Kurdish daily), p. A2.
Ali, Nuri (25 June 2005). KRG agrees that peshmerga will become 'regional guard'. Kurdistani New (Kurdish daily), p. A2.2.Eagleton, William Jr. (1963). The Kurdish Republic of 1946. Oxford University Press.
Eagleton, William Jr. (1963). The Kurdish Republic of 1946. Oxford University Press.3.Ghassemlou, Abdul Rahman (1965). Kurdistan and the Kurds. Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Collet’s Ltd.
Ghassemlou, Abdul Rahman (1965). Kurdistan and the Kurds. Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Collet’s Ltd.4.Gunter, Michael M. (Spring 1996). The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq. The Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2, pgs 225-241.
Gunter, Michael M. (Spring 1996). The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq. The Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2, pgs 225-241. 5.Izady, Mehrdad R. (1992). The Kurds: A Concise Handbook. Taylor and Francis, 1992.
Izady, Mehrdad R. (1992). The Kurds: A Concise Handbook. Taylor and Francis, 1992.6.Kirkuki, Hawar (28 December 2006). Kurds make breakthrough on talks with Iraq. The Kurdish Globe, p. A1.
Kirkuki, Hawar (28 December 2006). Kurds make breakthrough on talks with Iraq. The Kurdish Globe, p. A1.7.Lortz, Michael G. (2005), (Thesis) Willing to Face Death: A History of Kurdish Military Forces—the peshmerga—from the Ottoman Empire to Present-Day Iraq. The Florida State University, Collage of Social Sciences.
Lortz, Michael G. (2005), (Thesis) Willing to Face Death: A History of Kurdish Military Forces—the peshmerga—from the Ottoman Empire to Present-Day Iraq. The Florida State University, Collage of Social Sciences.8.McDowall, David. A Modern History of the Kurds. I.B. Tauris, 2004.
McDowall, David. A Modern History of the Kurds. I.B. Tauris, 2004.9.O’Ballance, Edgar (1996). The Kurdish Struggle 1920-94. MacMillan Press, Ltd.
O’Ballance, Edgar (1996). The Kurdish Struggle 1920-94. MacMillan Press, Ltd.10.Radio Free Iraq (14 June 2007). 2,000 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters to keep security in Diala. Retrieved on 23 February, 2008 from: http://www.iraqupdates.com/p_articles.php/article/p_articles.php/article/18333
Radio Free Iraq (14 June 2007). 2,000 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters to keep security in Diala. Retrieved on 23 February, 2008 from: http://www.iraqupdates.com/p_articles.php/article/p_articles.php/article/18333 11.Robinson, Linda (2004). Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces. Public Affairs.
Robinson, Linda (2004). Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces. Public Affairs.12.Sharp, Jeremy M. (25 March 2005). Iraq’s New Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences. CRS Report for Congress, 25 March 2005.
Sharp, Jeremy M. (25 March 2005). Iraq’s New Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences. CRS Report for Congress, 25 March 2005.13.Full text of the Washington Agreement between the KDP and the PUK leaders, available at: http://www.kurdistanica.com/english/legal/papers/doc-0001.html
Full text of the Washington Agreement between the KDP and the PUK leaders, available at: http://www.kurdistanica.com/english/legal/papers/doc-0001.html14.Full text of the CPA’s Transitional Administration Law is available at:
Full text of the CPA’s Transitional Administration Law is available at:http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html
15.The joint Barzani and Talabani letter to the U.S. President George W. Bush, available at
The joint Barzani and Talabani letter to the U.S. President George W. Bush, available athttp://www.navend.de/aktuell/pdf/2004-06-17/Brief%20Talabani%20und%20Barzani.doc
16.Unofficial English translation of the Iraqi Constitution by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, available at: http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/projects/unami_iraq_constitution.pdf
Unofficial English translation of the Iraqi Constitution by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, available at: http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/projects/unami_iraq_constitution.pdf_________________________
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