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October 9, 2008
News
The Mishap of Sam Brannen: Turkey’s Klaus Fuchs
Kurdishaspect.com - By Raz Jabary
In a recent article named “The Misrule of Massoud Barzani: Iraqi Kurdistan’s Yasser Arafat” published in the “WorldPoliticsReview” by Sam Brannen, the author shows his discontent with the president of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, Massoud Barzani, and claims how his politically-related decisions and consequent actions would may make him “go down as the Yasser Arafat of the Kurdish people”. In this invalidation article I would like to factually and in a falsifiable nature address Mr. Brannen’s incorrect judgments regarding the region and its official president.
1) Peace and stability in the Kurdistan Region
Mr. Brannen starts off his article with a disillusioned sentence that would give the reader a sense of confusion. He states that “the Kurdish north is increasingly a source of unrest, whereas it once was an oasis of stability in Iraq”. Clearly, Mr. Brannen is unaware of the extraordinary safety record in the region that prospered since the toppling of the former Iraqi regime, whereas it previously was a hotspot of Kurdish citizens who were in constant fear of undergoing the same fate as the inhabitants of the Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988 when the latter was gassed with chemicals by the Iraqi regime. Between 1992 and 2003 Allied aircraft had to fly routine flights over parts of the Kurdistan Region above the 36th parallel in order to diminish the threat of a potential Iraqi aerial attack against the Kurds. That is how hostile the situation used to be. Some stability facts from the famous record as follows: Since 2003, Hawler (or Erbil), the capital city and parliamentary seat of Southern Kurdistan, has been proven to be safer than London. Ever since the start of the American surge and consequent stationing in Iraq, no single American soldier has been injured or killed in an act of terrorist nature in the Kurdistan Region. With the improvement in the stability and organization of the official Kurdish national security forces, the Peshmerga, who once were the guardian saviors of Kurdish children, men and women from the cruelty of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, the Kurdistan Region is increasingly becoming a source of peace, freedom and stability. We have seen an increasing number of Arab families satisfactorily permanently settle on a
coexistent basis with the Kurds in the north in fear of religious or political persecution or the potentially disastrous aftermath of a deterioration in relations between Iraq’s main sectarian groups.
2) Massoud Barzani’s commitment to a democratic, federal and reconciliatory Iraq
In Mr. Brannen’s claim in the Kurdistan Region allegedly “becoming a danger to the country and to its people”, I would like to stress that the overwhelming majority of the Kurdish people demand a higher degree of realization of Kurdish political aims than president Massoud Barzani does and seems committed to. In a 2005 referendum in the Kurdistan Region on January 30th, 2005, 98% of Kurdish voters in the Iraqi national elections voted for full Kurdish independence. Instead, Mr. Barzani has shown his consistent commitment to the continuation of the existence of the Iraqi state, but as a federal entity in order to allow for a further degree of self-government for the different Iraqi communities which insist on constructing their own future within Iraq’s national boundaries. What Mr. Brannen does not seem to be aware of is that highly regarded Iraqi political leaders like Ayad Allawi and Ahmad Chalabi have consistently said in public that the Iraqi Kurds have the right to secede*, neglected by Mr. Barzani’s insistence to remain part of a democratic and federal Iraq, where the inalienable rights of the Kurds as a previously disadvantaged group are defended and where the essential freedoms of expression, assembly, association and the media are allowed to flourish for the Kurds as well. Mr. Barzani has publicly stated on many occasions that if the rights and freedoms of the Kurds in the new Iraq were not respected as they had not been previously, then he would not hesitate to declare an independent Kurdish state in the benefit and well-being of the Kurdish people in order to prevent the national suffrage caused to them in the past, the latter which would seem a responsible thing to do for a head of a state/region when it would come to it. However, it has not come to this so far and what we have therefore seen instead was that after January 22nd, 2008, when the new Iraqi flag was adopted as the country’s new symbol of freedom, the flag was all too proudly raised in the Kurdish Parliament and Kurdish public buildings to symbolize the end of a dictatorship and the beginning of prosperity and peace in the new Iraq. Since recently, Kurdish Peshmerga were sent to the Iraqi capital to guard the peace on the insistence of Mr. Barzani, with the aim of committing the Kurds towards gaining the same achievements made in Kurdistan in the rest of Iraq. I do not see where this so-called “danger” comes from, which Mr. Brannen seems to claim.
3) The issue of the Kurds in Turkey and the PKK
Mr. Brannen falsely claims that Mr. Barzani “has refused to cooperate with Turkey to combat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that operates from safe havens in territory ostensibly under his control”. First of all, I have intentionally left out the phrase ‘terrorists’ with which Mr. Brannen describes the PKK, for the following reason: as a guerrilla movement, but with a substantial influence in politics, the rebellion of the PKK against strategic and military targets is similar to that of the Americans’ under George Washington who fought to liberate themselves from British oppression (1775-1783). It is the same to that of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (1968-2003) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (1975-2003) who fought against the Ba’ath oppression because breakthrough attempts in diplomacy leading to concessions to the Kurds were not being tolerated.
The PKK rebels could have justifiably been described as ‘terrorists’ had Turkey insisted on an armed truce, consequently neglected by the PKK, and instead embarked on a mission of solving the Kurdish question in diplomatic terms by setting up a representative board that would consist of non-partisan lawmakers and local governors, directly derived from areas they inhabit in the Kurdish areas. These ought to become part of a regional council, incorporating main Kurdish areas where it is known that they are in a majority. This particular example of compromise should be aimed at running an effective board for the Kurdish population, with an emphasis on ‘representative’. This latter principle should be followed from the Palestinian Fatah-Hamas example that ought to aim to gradually decrease Kurdish support for the PKK, then known that the legislative board – the would-be Kurdish equivalent of the Palestinian Fatah – will be a viable refuge, eventually leading to the ousting of the PKK by the Kurds themselves. In the end, this way of compromise aims to uphold the PKK as a group in its struggle and instead give in to legislative reforms to the Kurds as a people.
However, efforts by the Kurds to reach diplomatic compromise with the state have consistently been rooted out in Turkey, often being claimed to be affiliated to the PKK in order to rob them from their legislative background (On as recent as February 21st, 2008, Turkey even accused pro-Kurdish NGOs in the United States of America of granting support to the PKK, fiercely denied and countered by these organizations that were outraged by the accusations**). Instead, it has been the PKK which has several times called a truce to the armistice, each time on ignored by the Turkish government, which seems not to be interested to involve Kurdish representatives in searching for a solution to the question, be it only for installing pro-Turkish village guards in the struggle against the PKK. When we look at a prominent Western democracy like Germany with a substantial immigrated Turkish population, all peoples enjoy the basic freedoms as outlined above - including the Turks - unrelated to their ethnic origin or their separate beliefs. What explanation is there then, other than undemocratic, for Turkey not to allow these freedoms to flourish in their country for all peoples, including the largest ethnic minority which compromises a fifth of the entire population and which has lived together as a conscious nation on their historical land of origin for many centuries? Why is Mr. Brannen quick enough to address the aims of the PKK and what they have done, but not the rights of the Kurdish people in Turkey and what they have been done to?
To come back on Mr. Brannen’s accusing Mr. Barzani of not cooperating with Turkey in combating the PKK, Mr. Barzani actually has. In 1997 a joint KDP-PUK-Turkish force attempted to drive the PKK presence out of Southern Kurdistan. However, the impassable mountain ranges of Qandil proved a main obstacle in doing so, and eventually the operation failed. I have mentioned in previous articles many times how the PKK as a group without a headquarter complex, without a capital, without any substantial concrete targets in rugged terrain, or Turkey could ever be militarily defeated by the other. In a recent interview with news channel Al-Arabiya, Massoud Barzani pointed out clearly on a map of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region where the PKK had established military bases. It involved the most north-eastern tip of the Region, the most south-eastern tip of Turkey and along the border areas with Eastern Kurdistan (Iran). With this in mind and having experienced an earlier bloody defeat, it is very sensible and responsible towards the Kurdish people for Mr. Barzani not indeed to re-embark on military operations against the PKK, so losing Kurdish lives and resources and setting Kurdish communities from different parts of Kurdistan up against each other. Mr. Brannen further seems unaware of the fact that in early December 2006 Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, during a state visit to Iran, denounced a possible deployment of American forces alone, and more recently NATO forces, from central Iraq to the Kurdish north. However, he did seek support for the formation of a joint American-Turkish force to move into the Kurdistan Region instead***, causing high suspicions among the Iraqi Kurdish population and fears that targeting the PKK was not the sole purpose of the Turks.
4) Predetermination in elections?
In the middle part of his article Mr. Brannen claims that “if elections were held in Kurdistan, the outcome would be predetermined”. Now to focus on ‘predetermined’, Mr. Brannen fails to outline precisely what he means with the expression. If he would point to fraud in elections, I would like to point out to him the Iraqi constitution, according to which each Iraqi citizen past the age of eligibility must bring out his or her vote in the neighborhood where he or she is officially registered. This therefore prevents fraud by excessive votes by one eligible voter or a vote by an ineligible voter throughout the whole of Iraq, thus including the Kurdistan Region. If Mr. Brannen would mean that ‘predetermination’ would come into effect in election time by the influence of the two main Kurdish political parties which are part of the Kurdistan Alliance – mind: influence, not force – then he clearly expresses his opposition to the national will of the Kurdish people whom after decades of dictatorship insist to be governed by their own trusted parties of which they are part and of which they see a vote for them as being a patriotic duty. It has nothing to do with Mr. Barzani or any other influential politician, but merely with the beliefs of the Kurdish people. These people understand the background of the fact that the Kurdish political question is not based upon stable pillars at the moment being, but rather is in a process of development, instead being watched carefully all the time by neighboring countries with their own respective Kurdish minorities.
5) Deployment of Kurdish forces to Khaneqin
Mr. Brannen states Mr. Barzani “has deployed Kurdish Peshmerga forces in contested areas outside the established borders of the Kurdish region”. He states that “Mr. Barzani has jealously guarded his forces in a region that doesn’t especially need them. Mr. Barzani’s true goal is clear: expand the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan”. He does not refer to the specific places, but he most likely would mean the recent upheaval that was caused in a near-clash between Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi forces in the town of Khaneqin in the Diyala governorate. Firstly, indeed Mr. Brannen is correct in referring to Khaneqin as a contested area. Historically, geographically, ethnically and legislatively Khaneqin is a Kurdish town, whereby its population – men, women and youth – recently resisted the potential presence of Iraqi forces in the town in a public demonstration. The town is indeed contested in that political oppositionist movements against the Kurds, most notably among pan-Arab nationalist groups, fiercely resist the facts of Khaneqin’s nature as being Kurdish and returning under Kurdish control, a crucial aspect that Mr. Brannen fails to explain. Mr. Brannen also fails to explain that Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution that was approved by an overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people (80%) in 2005 and includes the normalization process of former places which have been the target of ethnic cleansing under previous regimes must return to their original state. This includes Khaneqin and also for instance Kirkuk and Sinjar, all of which lie still officially outside the borders of the Kurdistan Region, but yet after decades of ethnic cleansing still contain a vast majority of Kurds. However, after more than a year since the article should have been implemented, there are still no signs of the mutually agreed normalization. Last but not least, Mr. Brannen fails to tell his readers of the fact that the 34th battalion of the Kurdish Peshmerga had already been stationed in and around Khaneqin and in other places in the Diyala governorate on the call of the Iraqi government itself (and thus before the recent upheaval) with the aim of counteracting the presence of al-Qaida terrorists. It follows that Mr. Brannen’s statements are completely flawed as Peshmerga forces had not been deployed on the insistence of Mr. Barzani, and also clearly not with the aim of expanding the Kurdistan Region’s borders, but rather in an attempt to safeguard the region from terrorist activity. Since the start of the war in 2003, the Diyala governorate has proven to be one of the deadliest for American troops stationed in Iraq. I would like to urge Mr. Brannen to do a bit more research on American and civilian deaths in Diyala (and hence to falsify his own statement saying “the region doesn’t especially need forces”), particularly since recent times when al-Qaida militants have been believed to have moved into Diyala after the Anbar surge.
As a fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies of the U.S.-Turkey strategic and U.S.-Turkey-Iraq initiative, Mr. Brannen ought to have denounced the public interference of Iraq’s neighboring countries in its reconstruction process, instead of the commitment that the Kurds have shown in rebuilding the unitary state of Iraq and particularly that of Mr. Barzani as the president of the Kurdistan Region. The hands of Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi-Arabia that try to influence how Iraq is run are in contradiction to the national Iraqi sovereignty that must leave the Iraqis, including the Kurds, in charge of their own affairs. In his article, of which this article is an invalidation of, Mr. Brannen must have given his readers the actual sense of Mr. Barzani’s commitment to Iraqi unity, democracy and reconciliation, his representative and responsible role as the president of a substantial part of the Iraqi population and as a highly regarded Iraqi politician who has played a crucial role in the reconstruction process of the new Iraq. For the most part, Mr. Brannen’s comments seem highly out of touch and untrue. As a response, although this article was not written for the purpose of ridiculing Mr. Brannen, it serves as a correction of the issues forwarded by the author and aims to display to readers the true side of the story of Massoud Barzani and the Kurds in the new Iraq.
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* Galbraith Peter W. “The end of Iraq: How American incompetence created a war without end”. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006. p.216
** Khalid Shaida. “Turkey penetrates on support of the USA against Kurds”: http://www.nawandihalabja.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=65&Itemid=2, Hannover: CHAK, 10.05.06
*** Ekurd. “Turkey labeling Kurdish KNC, WKI & AIKN as "terrorist" organizations”: http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2008/2/turkeykurdistan1673.htm, 21.02.2008
Raz Jabary is a bilingual international debater and also permanent writer for SOMA Digest, a fortnightly paper distributed throughout Iraq.
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