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October 10, 2008
NEWS
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Crossing Khanaqeen
Soma - By Dr Denise Natali
The standoff between Iraqi military forces and Kurdish Peshmarga in Khanaqeen has left political relations between Erbil and Baghdad at their most fragile point since 2003.
While the central government regards the problem as a breach of territorial jurisdiction by Kurdish forces, the Kurds argue otherwise. As one of numerous disputed territories claimed by the Kurds, Khanaqeen has been patrolled by the Kurdish Peshmarga for over four years.
Accordingly, the Kurds have assured stability in the town and maintained relatively calm inter-communal relations. Yet, the real issue is not about the security of Khanaqeen.
Rather, it is rooted in the absence of any real partnership between Arabs and Kurds in the Iraqi state, failure of power-sharing between regions, and Baghdad’s refusal to clarify the territorial boundaries of disputed territories (art. 140), of which Khanaqeen is a part.
Given the unstable nature of Diyala province, it is not surprising that the central government has deployed Iraqi forces to the region. While some parts of Iraq have experienced a decline in armed violence, Diyala is still highly insecure as a stronghold of Al Qaida forces.
Increased security threats have warranted a US offensive in the region and attempts by the Sunni Arab Awakening Councils to fight Al Qaida militants.
The deployment of Iraqi troops to Diyala is also part of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki’s efforts for Baghdad to assume increasing responsibility of security in Iraq’s disputed territories.
Still, securing Diyala province should not be used as an excuse to further exclude the Kurds from key decision-making processes in the country.
Instead of consulting with Kurdish officials the central government has alienated them. Comments made by the representative of the Shia alliance, Sami Al Askeri publicly referring to the presence of the Kurdish Peshmarga in Diyala as “an outlaw militia” have done little to engender positive relations between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the central government.
Even though the KRG has agreed to withdraw Kurdish troops from Khanaqeen and hand over security to Iraq government forces, the larger issue of recognizing the KRG’s role in Iraq remains unsettled.
The Khanaqeen crisis shows that the Kurds are not a real partner in the central government or the state. Even though the constitution has legalized power-sharing and recognized the KRG as an official political entity, real power in the Kurdish north has been muted.
When significant meetings and decisions are made in Baghdad regarding the Kurdistan Region, Kurdish leaders are not invited or are informed afterward.
Instead of working with the Kurds or proposing joint security-sharing measures for the region, Iraqi officials continue to act unilaterally.
In fact, any partnership that may have existed with the central government – even in its partial form – has deteriorated over the past year.
Heightened tensions underline the challenges ahead for a workable power-sharing agreement between Kurds and Arabs in Iraq.
Despite constitutional mechanisms that exist, historical legacies and deep-rooted distrust between communities continues to shape intra-communal and inter-regional relations. Indeed, much depends upon what type of leaders will be in decision-making positions in Baghdad.
The Kurds may have Jalal Talabani, Barham Salih, Hoshyar Zibari, and Mahmoud Othman to currently defend their interests; however, they face an uncertain future when the leadership changes and they lose their influence in the central government.
Still, absence of a real partnership in Iraq does not necessarily mean that the Kurds have no role in the country or means to assure their interests.
The KRG may have lost some influence in Baghdad but it still has leverage in Iraq, particularly as it relates to economic development.
The Kurdistan Region is one of the most stable and economically viable areas of Iraq and the Kurds are one of the few groups in the Middle East that enjoy a positive relationship with the US government at the moment.
The region also has realized important benefits of political stalemate that was unthinkable a decade ago, including a US$7 billion annual budget or the legitimate rights to negotiate multi-million dollar investment projects for their region.
Although large economic development potential in the Kurdistan Region and political uncertainty in Iraq may not bode well for future power-sharing arrangements, they underline the need for external intervention and 3 party monitoring.
If foreign governments are concerned about stabilizing Iraq, accessing petroleum reserves, and engaging in lucrative reconstruction projects, then they will have to be equally concerned about remaining engaged in the country and promoting conflict resolution strategies in sensitive regions.
Unless a modicum of political trust is developed between Erbil and Baghdad, no real power-sharing can occur or be sustained. And without a commitment to power-sharing, the resolution of sensitive boundary issues will remain on hold for years to come.
Denise Natali is an honorary fellow at the Institute for Arab and Islamic Studies, Exeter University, and currently teaching at the University of Kurdistan-Hawler.
Printed with permission. From Soma
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