A Smarter Enemy in Iraq
Defense News - By Ramzy Mardini
The latest string of mass-casualty bombings in Iraq on Dec. 8 exposes not only Iraqi shortcomings in the security sector, but also the efficacy that militants still maintain in carrying out demanding operations. The attacks followed similar multicoordinated bombings in Baghdad on Aug. 19 and Oct. 25, killing nearly 300 Iraqis and wounding more than 1,000.
Today, militants are investing in high-profile terrorism to combat counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Iraq inherited a new security challenge when U.S. combat forces exited Iraqi cities June on 30, in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement arranged by the outgoing Bush administration. Without U.S. soldiers patrolling side by side with Iraqis in populated areas, deterrence-by-denial becomes less credible, giving insurgents a new basis for challenging a weaker security apparatus.
During the height of the Iraqi insurgency (2005-2007), Sunni insurgents and Shi'a militiamen invested resources and time to defend and hold territory. However, over the course of a population-centric COIN that began in 2007, insurgent strongholds were uprooted by the practice of "clear, hold and build" strategies.
But the loss of territorial possession has helped develop a smarter enemy better skilled at using its resources. The insurgent engagement vis-à-vis Iraqi forces had evolved from a costly and preoccupying defense to a purely offensive, asymmetric terrorist campaign.
Al-Qaida in Iraq has essentially "changed from a broad-based insurgency to a terrorist group trying to target the government," U.S. Gen. Raymond Odierno was quoted as saying in the Dec. 20 New York Times. Its objectives have become narrowed and realistic because they cease to be territorially defined. And the power to coerce, rather than control, is the standard for operational planning.
By aiming to build trust and confidence between the population and protection force, COIN fosters a rational framework for locals to cooperate and provide critical information without fearing retribution by insurgents. Today, insurgents seek to undermine these techniques by implanting within the population a sense of insecurity, suspicion and dwindling confidence.
Because of their limited resources (i.e., fewer safe houses, fighters) and loss of a territorial baseline, insurgents have been forced to think prudently about how to effectively confront their adversary.
Moreover, the battleground for combating the insurgency has become indistinguishable because no clearly defined militant stronghold or front exists. Militants can decide when and where they become active members of the resistance. For example, the upcoming parliamentary election in March is providing an ideal stage for targeting the confidence that COIN aims to achieve.
Terrorists also are exploiting areas of political sensitivity and ethnic tension. Their deadly harassment of the Awakening Movement provides a strong incentive in pressuring disgruntled and fearful Sunnis to opt out of the fight against Sunni terrorists as the Shi'a-led government delays their integration into the security and private sector.
In addition, insurgents have waged a destabilizing campaign in northern Iraq, fueling suspicions and sectarian rifts between Sunni Arabs and Kurds over the contentious issue of "disputed territories." Tensions have risen to the verge of armed conflict on multiple occasions, only to be defused by the intervention of U.S. combat forces.
The debate over Article 140 - a constitutional provision that aims to settle the dispute over territorial ownership between Arabs and Kurds - remains unresolved and a potential rationale for another civil war. In addition, the explosive issue of the first post-Saddam census has now been delayed until after all U.S. combat forces withdraw in August. These political proceedings offer real venues for exploitation and destabilization.
Regardless of the optimism expressive about Iraq's future, the security gains are "not irreversible," as commonly and subtly signaled by top U.S. military commanders. Although violence is down from the 2006-2007 highs, Iraq remains a fragile state riddled with intense sectarian identities, poor institutions, mass corruption and dictatorial patterns.
Reconciliation, the most critical piece for nation-building in a war-torn and fragmented society, has yet to take any meaningful root or sense of exigency by the ruling Shi'a factions.
Though Afghanistan has now captured the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy, it is unwise for President Barack Obama to hold to a unilateral withdrawal of all combat forces from Iraq by August. The United States ought to recognize that a successful election in 2010 (like in 2005) will unlikely directly improve security conditions in the future. Rather, reconciliatory progress, not necessarily fewer casualties or democratic processes, is the foundation for a prudent U.S. exit strategy.
To moderate the influence that terrorism could have in destabilizing Iraq in the long term, Obama should utilize the continued presence of combat forces as political leverage vis-à-vis Baghdad.
First, the United States should directly pressure Iraq to implement the "Odierno initiative," a proposal advocating for tripartite forces consisting of U.S., Iraqi and Kurdish soldiers to patrol the "disputed territories" in northern Iraq. Second, the U.S. military must peg the withdrawal of combat forces to Iraqi progress on reconciliation, corruption and resolving the issue of disputed territories.
Without a hardened mechanism in place for these outstanding concerns, terrorists will have much to work with after the United States makes its exit. ■
Ramzy Mardini is a Middle East analyst at the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington-based foreign policy think tank, who previously served on the Iraq desk at the U.S. Department of State.
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January 13, 2010
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