Khalilzad’s blueprint of a mythical Iraqi national government
2/21/2006
KurdishMedia.com - By Dr Rebwar Fatah
In his recent article Blueprint for a national government,
Zalmay Khalilzad, the US ambassador to Iraq, retreats
from some fundamental US policies, including some
strategic ones that justified the invasion of Iraq.
His article lacks fundamental understanding of the
social structure of Iraq. Khalilzad builds a mythical
“national unity” in his mind and resorts to a bullying-
language to command the Iraqi-imposed leadership to
build it. He prepares to undermine his entire country’s
principle in order to realise his mythical concept.
Furthermore, he prepares to negotiate with what were
not long ago termed by the Bush administration
“thugs” and “terrorists”, while scrapping
de-Baathification.
The frustration which Khalilzad demonstrates in his article could be interpreted as some degree of a resignation.
Fundamental misunderstanding of the Iraqi structure
Zalmay Khalilzad states:
“Saddam was skilled at pitting one group against another to strengthen his position. The insurgency and sectarian violence that have plagued Iraq since his downfall have only deepened these divisions. This was reflected in the recent election, in which Iraqis voted largely along ethnic and religious lines.”
Khalilzad demonstrated a fundamental lack of understanding of the social, ethnic and religious structure of Iraq. He implies that without oppression from Saddam, people would not have voted along ethnic and religious lines. Does he really expect a Kurd to vote for the Shiia party and vice versa? This flawed understanding leads him to a wrong conclusion in believing that Iraqi leaders can build a “national unity”.
Iraqi leaders must do as they are told
Zalmay Khalilzad has no interest in what the Iraqis want. He has a mission to fulfil, which is apparent from the commanding language which he uses, as well as his frustration tone. He uses either “must” or “need”, when he addresses the Iraqi leadership. Let us give some examples:
“First, they [Iraqi leaders] need to form a government of national unity.”
“Iraqi leaders also must agree to a decision-making process…”
“Iraq’s leaders now need to agree on a process to unite the country.”
“Next, Iraq’s leaders need to agree…”
“Iraqi leaders will limit de-Baathification…”
“Iraq’s leaders must forge an understanding with those insurgents who are willing to lay down their arms…”
Khalilzad treats Iraqi leaders as puppets on strings, whilst he sees himself as the puppet-master. He does not leave many decisions to his appointed leaders.
“Insurgents” are goodies; “terrorists” are babies
Khalilzad prepares to undermine all of the values that justified the invasion of Iraq to deliver mythical “national unity”. He is so desperate that he invites the “insurgents” to join his political process, but he is firm on “terrorists”. If you are, just like me, confused and don’t know the difference between these two groups, then listen to Khalilzad:
“Then, Iraq’s leaders must forge an understanding with those insurgents who are willing to lay down their arms, join the political process and, perhaps, even enlist in the fight against the terrorists.”
What happened to the principle of “no negotiation with terrorists?” Perhaps, Khalilzad is trying to justify bringing Muqtada al-Sadir’s group into the Iraqi leadership. It was not long ago that al-Sadir was no more than a “thug” in the eyes of the US.
This unfortunate conclusion leads him to start splitting hairs. He makes a distinction between “insurgents” and “terrorists”:
“Many [insurgents] are willing to do so, as evidenced by the clashes between insurgents and terrorists in western Iraq.”
If we have “insurgents” in Iraq, why do we need the multinational forces to fight “terrorists”?
Khalilzad must realise that Iraqi social structure does not conform to Western pictures that can be understood by identifying the “baddies” and the “goodies”. It is slightly more sophisticated and complex than the simplistic idea he lays out.
Demolish militia
On the one hand, Khalilzad invites insurgents to the political process, and has just accommodated the Jayish al-Mahdi to join the security forces. On the other hand, he wants to demolish the militia:
“The government must begin the process of demobilising the factional militias across the country.”
Khalilzad does not say what he means by “militia”. Does he regard Kurdish peshmerga, Qwat al-Badir and Jayish al-Mahdi as militia?
Khalilzad then wants to employ ministers who are not linked to Iraqi ethnic and religious groups:
“Elected leaders need to govern from the centre, not the ideological extremes. This is particularly true in the security area, where the new government must continue increasing the capability of Iraqi security forces while ensuring that Defence and Interior Ministry officials are chosen on the basis of competence, not ethnic or sectarian background.”
Does he really believe that he could employ a Sunni Arab minister who can advance Shiia Arabs or vice versa?
The Constitution needs to reflect Sunni Baathists
It is obvious that if “Insurgents” and “Baathists” join the political process, they will have demands on the constitution. From what has been witnessed so far, the Shiia do not compromise, and we shall thus see more compromise on Kurdish rights in the constitution.
“Iraqi leaders must strike agreements that will win greater Sunni Arab support and create a near-consensus in favour of the constitution.”
Baathists will stay in power
Khalilzad needs to accommodate former Baathists in building his “national unity”:
“Iraqi leaders will limit de-Baathification to high-ranking officials, integrating all those who did not commit crimes into mainstream society.”
Again, Khalilzad splits the Baathists into two groups, baddies and goodies. The baddies, I suppose, are half a dozen, who are currently on trial. Therefore, there will be no de-Baathification.
To build his mythical Iraqi national unity, the US has retreated from the reasoning that was given to invade Iraq.
Khalilzad’s blueprint for Iraqi national unity will be as successful as the British Iraq. The difference is that in the early 20th century, imposing superficial nation-states over ethnic and religious groups was possible by bloodshed, but in the 21st century, the mission of Iraqi national unity shall remain a myth.
Notes
Zalmay Khalilzad, The Peninsula, Blueprint for a national government, 18 February 2006
